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BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE COMMONS: ENSURING THE
RIGHT TO WATER IN RURAL COMMUNITIES
Jason Astle*
I. INTRODUCTION

More than one billion people in the developing world lack safe drinking
water.' The U.S. government estimates that by the year 2015 it is possible that up
to forty percent of the world's population will live in countries where water is in
short supply. 2 An estimated fourteen to thirty thousand people die each day from
water-related diseases. 3 Of those who die everyday from water infected with
disease, between 9,500 and 20,000 are children.4
While access to fresh water is not the only problem, limited supply is the
primary dilemma. The total fresh water supply on Earth is being diminished
through pollution, diversion, and depletion. 5 Only 0.77 percent of the total water
on Earth circulates as part of the water cycle, and even less circulates as rain
water-the only source of renewable fresh water.6 Less than one half of one
percent of the world's water is available for human consumption.7 Thus, the total
amount of water available for human consumption and use is extremely limited.
Population explosions, urbanization, industrialization, and agriculture have
increased demand for water while pollution has decreased the already limited
supply. 8 Increased demand for a limited water supply exacerbates the human crisis
worldwide.
The human right to water entitles everyone to an adequate amount of safe
water and is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of
water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal, and

* Jason Astle graduated from The Colorado College with a Batchelor of Arts in International Political
Economy in 1994. He joined the Peace Corps and worked as a Health and Water Sanitation Volunteer
in Cameroon, Africa from 2000 until 2002. He is currently a third year law student at the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law. The author would like to acknowledge the George Washington/Oxford
University International Human Rights Program for providing a forum within which this article was
able to more fully develop.
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WATER
TO
RIGHT
HUMAN
THE
GLEICK,
1. PETER
http://www.pacinst.org/reports/basic-waterneeds/human right_towater.pdf (last visited March 22,
2005) (hereinafter THE HUMAN RIGHT).
2. DOUGLAS JEHL, Introduction to WHOSE WATER IS IT?, at xvi (Bernadette McDonald & eds.,
Nat'l Geographic Society 2003).
3. Id.
4. Id at x.
5. See MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD 5 (2002).
6. Id.
7. JEHL, supra note 2, at xiv.
8. BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 5, at 6-9
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domestic hygienic requirements. 9 Many of the efforts to meet this challenge by
governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have failed on many
levels.10 This article advocates for the privatization of wells in rural areas as an
incentive to maintain both the quantity and the quality of local water while
improving access and availability. Rather than putting the wells into the hands of
large corporations, this article suggests a middle path wherein the owner of the
well would be a non-profit, non-governmental organization that leases the
operation to a local business person, who is accountable to both the organization
and the village. The large scale provision of water is a serious and growing
problem everywhere, especially for urban areas, but is beyond the scope of the
discussion here. "
In the face of these alarming trends, governments are faced with the problem
of ensuring that every one of their citizens has access to safe, fresh water. Part II
asks the question what is water: a human need or a human right? Part III addresses
whose water is it, by examining three typical models: (1) private control; (2)
government ownership; and (3) the "development" model. Part IV narrows the
focus to the more limited problem of access to water in rural areas of Africa, and
concentrates on methods of delivery. The conclusion addresses the concerns of
anti-privatization advocates and many of the problems the current system faces in
ensuring that rural communities have access to enough safe water to meet their
basic needs. Moreover, the conclusion will evaluate how privatized wells protect
the right to water in a human rights framework.
II. WHAT IS WATER?
There are two basic ways of conceptualizing water: (1) as a need
(commodity); or (2) as a right (entitlement). It is important to distinguish water as
a right versus a need. A right is something that creates obligations; whereas a need
carries with it no assurance of its provision. 12 Because water is essential to all
aspects of life from the basic need for drinking water, to growing food, to
industrial uses such as coolant in power plants, there is no consensus on the
question of whether water is a need or a right.
Businesses and pro-market institutions such as the World Bank insist that
water is a need or commodity better managed in free markets.' 3 They argue that
9. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 15, The Right to Water, U.N. ESCOR Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C. 12 (2002) [hereinafter Comment 15].
10. For example, only 60 percent of a project to provide water to the Cameroonian capital of
Yaounde was completed and the contracting company quit after several officials were accused of
demanding payoffs. Sylvestre Tetchiada, Little to Quench the Nation's Thirst, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
May 17, 2004 at http://allafrica.com/stories/200405200689.html.
11. Much has been written in the last five years after many experiments by cities around the
world. Most of the sources used here draw on those examples and discussions. Few address the small
village except as farmers or customers hooked up to a municipal system. The focus here is on villages
that depend on surface and well water.
12. See JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, EVERY DROP FOR SALE 78 (2001).
WATER
OF
BANK,
ECONOMICS
13. WORLD

SANITATION,

http://www.worldbank.org/watsan/topics/economics.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
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markets are efficient and reduce waste, ensuring that limited resources will be fully
utilized. On the other side, environmentalists and local populations insist they
14
Kofi Annan, U.N.
have a right to water-that it cannot be denied to them.
that "[a]ccess to
by
stating
both
arguments
logic
of
the
blended
Secretary General,
human right.'"' 5
basic
a
therefore,
and,
need
safe water is a fundamental human
The right to water as a human right, though controversial, is well established in
6
international legal theory as well as in traditional practice.1 This section addresses
both arguments in turn.

A. Water as a Human Need
Water is clearly a need in the broad sense as a fundamental necessity of life,
regardless of the label of need or right. Water as a commodity, a good that can be
sold in the market, is the more narrow meaning of need. It is important to
acknowledge from the start that water is in fact bought and sold, given a value, and
paid for everyday, in all contexts. Water, like lunch, is never free. Even where no
money is paid, opportunity costs are incurred when fetching and using water for
whatever purpose. For example, water taken from a river has to be carried, that
energy could be spent on other activities. Water could also be contaminated,
which would involve additional costs in terms of time and money for medical care.
Thus, even in circumstances where no money goes into developing the source,
7
there is a cost for using that water. Those costs can be translated into value.'
Value as an economic term means the amount an individual is willing to pay
for the good or service. 18 This means that value is inherently subjective, not
intrinsically connected to the water itself; it is a function of the buyer. Cost as an
economic term is more complicated, but essentially it is the amount the seller has
spent to make the water available. This can be broken down into two types of
costs: (1) opportunity costs (described above, they can also include environmental
19
Use costs are the
damage and other intangible costs); and (2) use costs.
2°
traditional costs associated with developing, transporting, and managing water.

14. See generally LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Romina Picolotti & Jorge D.
Taillant eds. 2003) (discussing a wide range of issues linking human rights and environmental issues).
15. Press Release, U.N. Information Service, Access to Safe Water Fundamental Human Need,
Basic Human Right, says Secretary-General in Message on World Water Day available at
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2001/sgsm7738.html (Mar. 13, 2001).
16. See THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1; Comment 15, supra note 9; SALMAN M.A.
SALMAN & SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY

DIMENSIONS (2004).
17. See John Briscoe, Water as an Economic Good What it Means in Practice (1996), (World
Bank, A Paper Presented at the World Congress of the International Commission on Irrigation and
at
available
1996)
Cairo,
Drainage,
2
2
0
0ecnomicf%
http://www.iph.ufrgs.br/posgrad/disciplinas/hidp4/Briscoe,%2Water*/2Oas%20an %
good.pdf.

18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 2.
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Making water sellable requires calculating its costs to sellers and its value to
buyers, and where those two numbers meet is the price of water. 21 In a simple
supply and demand curve, water is not sold below its cost, and not paid for above
its value. When traded at this point, water is used in the most efficient manner, not
wasted or lost, and thus conserved.22 Markets also solve the problem of allocation
by determining how water is used and who gets to use it.
Because there are many competing demands for water-consumption,
agriculture, and industry, a finite resource like water has to be divided up. Markets
do precisely that-divide and allocate the limited supply of water. Water is
allocated to those who are willing to pay a price that allows the supplier to recover
costs. This excludes those who charge too much or who pay too little. However,
individuals act differently than corporations-value is also a function of the
resources available to the buyer. In the Sahara, the opportunity cost to other users
and the use costs to get the water will both be higher. Scarcity of water is also
highly variable. For example, countries along the Nile should pay less than
Saharan countries for the same amount of water. The problem is that life cannot be
sustained long without water, so its value (in terms of what a person is willing to
give up to have it) cannot be measured in any accurate manner.23
The difficulties encountered in determining the price of water were
summarized by John Briscoe in a World Bank paper entitled, Water as an
Economic Good: What itMeans in Practice, which was presented in 1996.24
Briscoe outlined various methodologies and then concluded that "most certainly
these 'ballpark estimates' can never, and should never, be used to make
technocratic decisions on allocations and prices. ''25 That did not prevent him from
declaring that "the hegemony of the market model of development, and the
corresponding move to using market-like and market-friendly instruments for
managing all elements of the economy (including water)" is part of a group of
ideas that will shape society in the future.26
Building on this work, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and multi-national corporations have pushed (some would say forced)
privatization of water on developing countries as a loan condition.27 Any
meaningful acknowledgement of the world's water crisis (i.e. recognizing the
fourteen to thirty thousand deaths every day from water-related disease) requires a
21. This is the traditional supply and demand curve, with quantity on the x axis, dollars on the y
axis. A supply curve rises as both quantity and dollars go up. Demand starts at a high quantity and low
price and falls as price goes up. Id.at 4.
22. The "optimal price" is the foundation of basic supply and demand driven market economics.
Id.
23. See PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF

GLOBALIZATION

AND

PRIVITIZATION

OF

FRESH

WATER

7

(2002)

available

at

http://www.pacinst.org/reports/new-economy-f-lwater/new-economyof-water.-ES.pdf.
24. Briscoe, supra note 17.
25. Id.at 5.
26. Id.at 22.
(2003)
PRIVATIZATION
PROMOTING
27. THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY,
http://www.icij.org/water/report.aspx?slD=ch&rlD=44&alD=45 (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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simultaneous recognition that water cannot be wasted. Waste is also an economic
term describing a condition that occurs when the price is set below or above the
optimal point where supply and demand meet.28 In practical terms, this means that
when water is treated as free, or is priced well below its cost and subsidized, water
is wasted.29 Additionally, corrupt governmental practices or use of water for
political patronage also create waste by diverting water to users or uses that are
inefficient.3" Private corporations, on the other hand, bring market efficiencies,
capital. 3'
management experience, and most importantly-private investment
Not surprisingly, many corporations have taken advantage of this situation
and have gone into the business of providing water. The annual revenue of the
three biggest multinational water corporations in 2001 was almost 160 billion
dollars.32 The most obvious example is the bottled water industry. Many
supplies. 33
countries, such as Cameroon, are also privatizing their municipal water
The Bolivian example described below is dramatic in terms of both the application
of market theory and the reaction by the population to such a scheme.
In 1999, the city officials of Cochabamba, Bolivia put water services under
the control of a for-profit corporation.34 The corporation, Aguas del Tunmari (a
subsidiary of Bechtel), seemed a sensible choice at the time because the
35
The
government did not have the money or resources for new investments.
36
that
assumed
It
was
current system was dilapidated, costly, and inefficient.
37
the
contrary,
To
discipline.
private capital would improve services and impose
the ultimate results were high prices and a popular rebellion. 38 When the vast
majority of citizens could no longer afford the price of water, they took to the
streets. 39 Hundreds of thousands of protestors eventually drove Bechtel's
subsidiary from the country. 40 The same process occurred more recently in El
28. Briscoe, supra note 17, at 4.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., E.A. Brett, Participationand Accountability in Development Management, 40 J. OF
DEV. STUD. 1, 13 (2003) (describing cooperative systems in Uganda as having been captured by local
elites and becoming mechanisms for personal enrichment and fraud).
at
Water,
to
Right
The
Shultz,
Jim
31. See
http://www.fntg.org/news/index.php?op-read&articleid=814 (Mar. 1, 2004); Clay J. Landry & Terry L.
Anderson, The Rising Tide of Water Markets at http://www.ittind.com/waterbook/tide.asp (last visited
Jan. 29, 2005); James Winpenny, Financing Water for All, 2003 REPORT OF THE WORLD PANEL ON
at
available
INFRASTRUCTURE
WATER
FINANCING
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/download/CamdessusSummary.pdf.
32. Landry & Anderson, supra note 31 at 74.
33. Tetchaida, supra note 10; see also, WATER AND SANITATION PROGRAM, RURAL WATER
SECTOR REFORM IN GHANA: A MAJOR CHANGE IN POLICY AND STRUCTURE (2002), available at
2

http:www.ruralwaterpsp.org/files/extemaWSP%20Ghana%20RWS%20sector%/ Oreform.pdf
(describing changes in rural water supply in Ghana, including privatization of some services).
34. JEHL, supranote 2, at 3.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Alto, Bolivia. In January of 2005, legions of angry residents rose up against Aguas
del Illimani (a subsidiary of French giant Suez) forcing President Carlos Mesa to
cancel their contract.4 1
There is no question that markets bring efficiencies to the allocation,
provision, and delivery of water.42 In addition, markets bring economic incentives
to those who profit from the sale of water. There is also no question that
governments in developing countries have generally done a poor job of providing
high quality water to their citizens.43 For that reason, the privatization of water has
been an increasingly attractive course." At the end of the day, it is governments,
no matter how they choose to do it, who are ultimately responsible for providing
water, regardless of how it is used.
B. Water as a Human Right
The growing consensus around the world is that water is more than just an
essential need-it is a human right. Since The U.N. Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (the "Committee"), issued General Comment 15, The
Right to Water, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), most of the world community has come to accept their
conclusions.45 Few international treaties or declarations explicitly establish a
human right to water, but in much the same way that customary international law
is established through objective acceptance of norms and a subjective sense of
obligation to acknowledge the right, water has become a human right.46 Examined
in conjunction with the right to development, water becomes an immediately
enforceable right, a right to be progressively realized, and part of a larger process
of ensuring the full range of rights, including political and social rights.47
Beyond international agreements, international actions such as three World
Water Forums and a U.N. declaration establishing 2003 as the International Year
of Freshwater have brought attention and focus on the right to water, generating
scholarship and commentary from all quarters.48 As previously noted, though farreaching agreement exists, it cannot be said that a true consensus exists. Private

41. Juan Forero, Even for Basics, Latin America Lacks Answers, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005.
42. Landry & Anderson, supra note 31; Winpenny, supra note 31.
43. GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23, at 2.
44. See Landry & Anderson, supra note 31; GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23, at iii-iv; Briscoe,
supranote 17.
45. The majority of the sources cited here support the acceptance of water as a human right. See,
e.g,. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 16 (outlining the legal and social basis for water
as a human right).
46. Customary International law is typically defined as conduct, or the deliberate absence of
conduct, by states as a general practice followed by a sense of legal obligation. See HENRY J. STEINER
& PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 69-72 (2nd ed. 2000).

47. The Right to Development will be more fully examined in Part Two infra.
48. See Al Gore & Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks at U.N. World Summit for Social
Development, Copenhagen, (Mar. 12, 1995), in 6 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 235, available at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1995/html/Dispatch6no13.html (Mar. 27, 1995); Ruana
Rajepakse, Water as a Human Right: Legal Social and Economic Implications, at
http://www.elaw.org/resources/printable.asp?id=2019 (July 29, 2005).
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corporations and the World Bank have tenaciously continued to describe water as a
need and a commodity without directly opposing the assertion of water as a right.49
1. The Legal Basis for Water as a Human Right
The Committee, in General Comment No. 15, directly addresses the legal
basis for the right to water. ° Article 11, paragraph 1 of the ICESCR recognizes
the "right of everyone to an adequate standard of living.., including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and the continuous improvement of living conditions.'
The Committee explicitly stated: "The right to water clearly falls within the
category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of living,
particularly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for survival. 52
Other international treaties, declarations, and documents have also recognized the
right to water. 53 Under humanitarian law, the right to water is protected under the
Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners.54 The U.N. Convention on the Rights of a Child explicitly
states in Article 24 that:
States parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health... [and] shall pursue full implementation of this
right and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures ... [t]o combat disease
and malnutrition.., through the provision of adequate nutritious food and clean
drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of
55
environmental pollution.

49. The main forum for this view is the World Water Council. The Council is criticized for
consisting mainly of "an exclusive membership of international financial institutions, large
multinational water corporations, and non-governmental organizations tied to these interests."
Hemantha
Withanage,
Water, An
Economic
Good or a
Public Good?,
at
http://www.elaw.org/assets/word/sri%201anka.water/2Oa%20public%20good.doc (last visited Mar. 20,
2005).
50. Comment 15, supra note 9.
51. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entered into force Jan. 3,
1976, art. 11 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
52. Comment 15, supra note 9, at 9 3.
53. Id. T 4; see also ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, HEIGHTENED AWARENESS OF WATER ISSUES at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Water/heightened-awareness.asp (last visited June 30, 2004)
(listing major international conferences in the 1990's dealing with water).
54. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating
to
the
Protection
of
Victims
of
International
Armed
Conflicts
(Protocol I), entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, 125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 54 (emphasis added); Standard
Minimum
Rules
for
the
Treatment
of Prisoners,
adopted
Aug.
30,
1955
by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24
U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res.
2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977),
13, 15, 21; see also Jalvarez,
The Right to Water as a Human Right, in Picolotti & Jorge D. Taillant, supra note 14, at 75.
55. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted nov. 20 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 44, art. 24.
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National action to regulate water and domestic policies enacted to protect
water quality and availability also recognize water as an entitlement.56 The South
African Constitution states: "Everyone has the right to have access to... sufficient
food and to sufficient water., 57 The United States has enacted domestic laws such
as the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 to ensure that water systems meet
minimum standards for protecting public health.58 Even the Vatican has declared
water a human right. 59 Finally, international instruments negotiated to divvy up
water across State boundaries recognize water as some form of entitlement.6 °
The Committee, in General Comment 15, essentially inferred the right to
water from the language of international instruments. 6' Water is deemed a human
right by linking such rights as the right to life, the right to food, and the right to
health, and recognizing that water is essential to human existence as a precondition to all rights. 62 Thus, water must be viewed in a larger context by looking
at the right to development and the interaction between established rights, human
needs, and domestic policies.
2. The Right to Development
The right to development was officially established in 1986 when the
Declaration on the Right to Development was adopted by the United Nations. 63 By
1993, full international consensus was reached when the United States (the only
dissenting vote) affirmed the right to development at the Vienna Second U.N.
World Conference on Human Rights. 64 Arjun Sengupta, author of The Human
Right to Development, has defined the right to development this way: "The right to
development is the right to a process of development, consisting of a progressive
and phased realization of all the recognized human rights... as well as a process of
economic growth consistent with human rights standards. 65
This definition contains within it two important characteristics shared by the
right to water. First, the right to development is a composite right where all rights
are interdependent and realized together-and not simply aggregated or added
up. 66 Second, the right to development can only be realized when other rights are
advanced and no others are violated.67 The effect of these characteristics is to

56. Jalvarez, supra note 54.
at
available
§
27(b),
2,
chapter
CONST.
AFRICAN
57. S.
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/bills/sacon96.htmlrebookmark=l (last visited April 16, 2005).
58. Jalvarez, supra note 54, at 76.
59. Water Access is a Human Right, Vatican Document Says, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Briefs, Apr.
18, 2003, at 9 (Gill Donovan ed.).
60. GLEICK ET. AL., supranote 23 at 11-20.
61. See generally SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 16 (detailing the human right to
water and the legal basis for the Committee's Comment 15).
62. See THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER, supranote 1; Picolotti & Taillant, supranote 14; SALMAN
& MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 16.
63. Arjun Sengupta, The Human Right to Development 32 OxFORD DEV. STUD. 179 -203 (2004).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 182.
66. Id. 183.
67. Id.
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create a right that reconciles any conflict between the civil and political rights and
the economic, social, and cultural rights. 68 Development as a right is both a
process and an outcome. As a process, the right must be realized in a legal
structure containing five principles: (1) equity, (2) non-discrimination, (3)
participation, (4) accountability, and (5) transparency (the "Five Basic
Principles"). 69 The right to development as an outcome creates duties on dutybearers. 70 Sengupta explains the relationship between duty-bearers and rightholders as follows:
Human rights are universally regarded as moral entitlements of individuals.
When they are translated into legal rights, the right-holders can legitimately
demand that the duty-bearers, once they are identified, be accountable for
carrying out their obligations and be subjected to a mechanism to monitor
and
71
adjudicate their performance, prescribing remedies in case of failures.
The right to water, viewed through this lens must include the economic nature
of water as a good to be provided and as a right that cannot be withheld. In this
way, the right to water is also part of the right to development.72 This approach
eliminates the problem of trying to determine which rights come first because the
right to water is part of rights such as the right to life and health. If all rights must
be realized to secure the right to development, then the provision of water is all
that is required of governments (the duty-bearer) in a rights-based system adhering
to the basic principles. Governments must also provide for the economic
development of water.73
3. Governmental Obligations
Every government has an obligation to ensure that all citizens have access to
enough water to meet their basic needs without discrimination.74 This obligation
comes in the context of the broad obligations all governments face with regard to
human rights-the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill. 75 The Committee
also recognized that the ICESCR provides for "progressive realization" of the
rights contained within it. 76 This is the acknowledgment that the availability of
resources constrains the ability of governments to provide the full range of rights
contained within the Covenant. 77 These constraints do not in any way relieve State
Parties (signatory governments) from their obligations or duties such as the
68. For a good description of this conflict, see Malcom Malone & Deryke Belshaw, The Human
Rights-BasedApproach to Development: Overview, Context and CriticalIssues, 20 Transformation 76,
78 (2003).
69. Sengupta, supranote 63, at 181.
70. Id. at 186.
71. Id.
72. For a good discussion of a rights based approach to development, see WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
9-11 RIGHT TO WATER (2003).
73. Sengupta, supra note 63, at 193, 194.
74. Comment 15, supranote 9, at 13.
75. Id., 20 (stating: "The right to water, like any human right, imposes three types of obligations
on States parties: obligations to respect, obligations to protect and obligations tofufi./l.")
76. Id., 17.
77. Id.
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requirement of forward progress and strict limitation on any regressive measures. 78
These general obligations were distilled into nine "Core Obligations" specific to
the right to water:
1. To ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water that is
sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease;
2. To ensure the right of access to water and water facilities and services on a
non-discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged or marginalized groups;
3. To ensure physical access to water facilities or services that provide
sufficient, safe and regular water that have a sufficient number of water outlets to
avoid prohibitive waiting times; and that are at a reasonable distance from the
household;
4. To ensure personal security is not threatened when having to physically
access water;
5. To ensure equitable distribution of all available water facilities and
services;
6. To adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan of action
addressing the whole population. The strategy and plan of action should be
devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and transparent
process. It should include methods, such as right to water indicators and
benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored. The process by which
the strategy and plan of action are devised, as well as their content, shall give
particular attention to all disadvantaged or marginalized groups;
7. To monitor the extent of the realization, or the non-realization, of the right
to water;
8. To adopt relatively low-cost targeted water programmes to protect
vulnerable and marginalized groups;
9. To take measures to prevent, treat and control diseases linked to water, in
particular ensuring access to adequate sanitation.7 9
The Committee also discussed violations of the right to water, including acts
of omission such as failures to take steps to provide water for everyone, failure to
create national policies on water, and the failure to enforce the laws. 80 Acts of
omission would include regressive actions that contradict any of the Core
Obligations such as the repeal of measures that provide for the realization of the
right to water. Finally, the Committee listed typical examples of violations of the
obligations to respect, protect, or fulfill the right to water.81
The obligation to respect the right to water prevents governments from
interfering with the right to water.8 2 Such interference would include inter alia:
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See
Id.,
/d.,
Id.,
Id.

id., 18-19.
38.
43.
44.
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the arbitrary exclusion from water facilities, discriminatory increases in the price
of water, and the pollution of water sources. 83 A violation of the obligation to
protect the right to water includes inter alia: a failure to protect against the
inequitable extraction of water, the failure to control water service providers, and
the failure to protect water distribution systems. The obligation to fulfill the right
to water requires that governments "take all necessary steps to ensure the
realization of the right to water., 85 Violations include: the failure to implement a
national water policy, the misallocation of public resources that harms vulnerable
or marginalized populations,
and a failure to ensure a minimal essential level is
86
enjoyed by everyone.
Drawing on the discussion of the right to development above, the progressive
realization of the right to water must also include adherence to the basic principles
(equity, non-discrimination, participation, accountability, and transparency). For
example, the obligation to implement a national water policy must come in a
context that ensures other rights, such as civil and political rights, are not
violated.87 This implies that a basic democratic structure is required to ensure the
full realization of the right to water in a national context. 88 Thus, a national or a
local water policy must be developed in accordance with human rights standards as
well as produce an outcome that ensures everyone has access to adequate amounts
of safe water.89 If they do not, the result is what happened in Bolivia-protests in
the streets forcing governmental action. Such a result leaves governments
suddenly saddled with the responsibility of managing a water system that was
privatized because it was too costly for them to manage in the first place. 90
III. WHOSE WATER IS IT?
Sylvestre Tetchiada, in Little to Quench the Nation's Thirst, declares: "If you
knew how many plans and resolutions there have been about [Cameroon's] water
problems, you would be hard put to understand why (people are) still without
potable water."9' There are three basic ways that water is actually provided to the
people: private companies, government entities, and community based
development projects. Each of these methods contains strengths and weaknesses.
This section briefly looks at all three methods relative to both how well they
provide safe, adequate water, and how well they comply with human rights
standards.

83. Id., 44(a).
84. Id., 44(b).
85. Id., 44(c).
86. Id.
87. For a more detailed discussion of the relation between Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and Civil and Political Rights, see STEINER & ALSTON, supra 46 at 268-275.
88. This debate is beyond the scope of the discussion here. See id. However, it is important to the
discussion in Section III to see the relationship between these five legal principles and the differences
between private, government, and development approaches.
89. See generally Sengupta, supra note 63 (discussing the relationship between the means and the
ends of the realization of the right to development).
90. See Forero, supra note 4 1.
91. Tetchiada, supra note 10.
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A. Privatization
In a World Bank technical paper entitled, Evaluating Water Institutions and
Water Sector Performance, authors R. Maria Saleth and Ariel Dinar succinctly
state the goals of a privatization approach to institutional reform. These goals are
to "address water as an economic good, strengthen allocation capabilities, increase
the reliance on market forces, revive the payment culture, ensure financial selfsufficiency, promote decentralized decision structure, and encourage the adoption
of modem technology and information inputs." 92 It is with these goals in mind
(and, of course, turning a profit) that corporations get into the business of
providing water. As the name implies, privatization starts from the premise that
the government is the first owner/manager of water systems.
The manner in which governments turn water over to corporations can take
many different forms. Accompanying the transfer, governments may impose some
regulatory oversight or basically relinquish all control and responsibility. 93 Some
governments will simply sell off their water assets.94 Another method is to lease
assets. 95 Finally, countries may create a contractual relationship wherein a
corporation is guaranteed profits in exchange for investments. 96 Regardless of how
privatization occurs the result is a market driven pricing structure, usually with
subsidized pricing to protect the poor.97 Typically this is found in urban areas
where piped water is delivered to homes or communal spigots. 98 From the point of
view of the consumer, privatized water means paying a bill to a company who can
both raise prices and turn off the water based on cost and profit considerations.99
From the point of view of the government, privatization 00means investment in
upgrading, expanding, and improving existing infrastructure.'
The criticisms of privatization are strong. Jim Shultz, in an article entitled
The Right to Water criticizes: "Far from being an effective strategy for advancing
rights, privatization and subjecting water access to the inequalities of the private
market has too often turned out to be a blunt instrument for violating human
rights."' 0 ' The overwhelming concern is giving the power of excluding people
from water to unaccountable private organizations a lI Cochabamba or El Alto,

9,

92. R. Maria Saleth & Ariel Dinar, Evaluating Water Institutions and Water Sector Performance,
at
available
(1999)
447
PAPER
TECHNICAL
BANK
WORLD

http://www.worldbank.org/watsan/topics/economics.html.
93. GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23, at 26-28.
94. Id.; See also
PRIVATIZATION

OF

AFRICA-EUROPE FAITH AND JUSTICE NETWORK, WATER A RIGHT FOR ALL!
WATER

AND

SANITATION

IN

SERVICES

AFRICA

4

(2003),

at

http://www.aetjn.org/Documents/water.pdf (last visited January 29, 2005) (describing various models
of water management).
95. GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23, at 26-28.

96. Id.
97. Id. But see the Bolivian example in JEHL, supra note 2 and Forero, supra note 41.
98. Id.
99. For example, in El Alto, Bolivia, Aguas' profits were not as high as they would have liked, so
they raised the hookup fees from $300 to $450 in a country where the monthly wage is about $55.
Forero, supra note 41.
100. Landry & Anderson, supra note 31; Winpenny, supra note 31.
101. Shultz, supranote 31.
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Boliva, discussed supra. When privatization policies are linked to larger economic
reforms required by the IMF and the World Bank, desperate countries relinquish
control and the poor suffer the consequences. 12
The World Bank declares on its website: "Effective water resource
management requires that water be treated as an economic good."' 0 3 This has
alarmed many who fear commodification as an erosion of water as a traditional
social good. 1°4 Commodification undermines the status of water as a human right
and shifts it back toward being a need that can be sold for profit. This conflict is
summarized by Peter Gleick et. al. in the article, The New Economy of Water: The
Risks and Benefits of Globalizationand Privitizationof Fresh Water:
However, there is little doubt that the headlong rush toward private markets has
failed to address some of the most important issues and concerns about water.
In particular, water has vital social, cultural, and ecological roles to play that
cannot be protected by purely market forces. In addition, certain management
values require direct and strong government support and
goals and social
05
protection.1
The privatization model is fraught with problems. Among them are: usurping
the responsibility of government; worsening economic inequities; failure to include
public participation; lessening the protection of water quality; and transferring
assets out of local control.' 0 6 Water as a commodity requires the exclusion of
others to its use and enjoyment when owned as a private property right.'0 7 If every
person has a right to a minimum amount of water each day, the ability to exclude
people and charge money for access to their water seems to stand in direct
opposition to that right.
Critics like Vandana Shiva, author of World Bank, WTO, and Corporate
Control Over Water, also contend that privatization fails to provide the benefits
promised. Vandana Shiva asserts: "Just as the economic reform policies guided by
the World Bank logic of privatization of food distribution create hunger, the
privatization of water services will create thirst and water scarcity." 08 For proof

102. See Sara Grusky, Privatization Tidal Wave: IMFIWorld Bank Water Policies and the Price
Paidby the Poor,2001 at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Water/Privitization Tidalwave.html. (last
visited January 29, 2005).
103. WORLD BANK, supra note 13.
104. See Rothfeder, supra note 12 (examining the world's water crisis); see also Barlow & Clark,
supra note 5 (examining the corporate "assault" on water).
105. See GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23, at 1.
106. Id.
107. This is a basic principle of the ownership of property and market economics. See Briscoe,
supra note 17.
108. Vandana Shiva, World Bank, WTO, and Corporate Control Over Water, 2001, at
(last visited Jan. 29,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Water/Corp-ControlWaterVshiva.html
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of this position, critics point to Bolivia, Ghana, South Africa, Australia, and even
Finally, critics point to the disproportionate burden
Atlanta, Georgia. 10 9
privatization imposes on women." o
These critiques are grounded in a concern for both the process of
privatization, via imposition of policies by the World Bank and others, and the
outcomes (e.g. high prices mean less access to water). The question remains
whether these are inevitable problems inherent to privatization. If privatization
were to be implemented within a structure that follows the Five Basic Principles of
human rights, many of these concerns may dissipate.
B. Government Control
The model of government control over water is the most familiar. In this
model, the government owns and develops water resources then provides it to the
public. "' Costs are off-set by taxes and other revenue including subsidized bills
to consumers."12 Govermnents manage water resources through different methods
such as out-right ownership, operation, and control through government
agencies. 13 Quasi-governmental agencies with a monopoly on water may be4
regulated by a board that has the power to determine water quality and pricing."1
These boards can be appointed or elected.1 5
The water crisis that faces the world today is the most powerful indictment of
government control of water." 6 The failure of government to provide waterrelated services underlies its desire to turn to private corporations to provide these
services.ti Governments, especially in the developing world, lack the financial
resources to meet the rising demand for water."18 For example, "[in Malawi]
limited financial resources, poor institutional structures and implementation of
environmental regulations, insufficient and unaffordable electricity supply, high
unemployment and insufficient public education and awareness have great

109. Maude Barlow, The Worlds Water: a Human Right or Corporate Good?, in JEHL, supra note
2, at 25-39.
Women
and
Water
Privatization,
2003,
at
110. See
Ana
Obando,
http://www.whrnet.org/docs/issue-water.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
111. See Guillermo Yepes, Do Cross-Subsidies Help the Poor to Benefit from Water and
Wastewater Services? Lessons from Guayaquil, 3, at http://www.wsp.org/pdfs/working-subsidy.pdf
(last visited January 29, 2005).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., AFRICA-EUROPE FAITH AND JUSTICE NETWORK, supra 94 (describing various
models of water management).
114. Id.
115. GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23.
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Jamal Saghir, Debate on current trends in water sector reform and pro-poor
partnerships, 4 (David Jones rapporteur, Sept. 2, 2002) (commenting: "However, in the last few decades
the result of funding the public sector to provide water and sanitation services has been quite
disappointing - the poor have not been reached and many resort to informal service provision as a
result.").
118. See, Winipenny, supra note 31; see also Forero, supra note 41 (reporting "governments like
Bolivia's tried the task themselves before, abandoned it as too costly, and turned to private companies
in the 1990's.").
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'1 19
Inefficient bureaucracies waste
influence on the scarcity of water resources."
sense when water is
water from both an economic standpoint and in a literal
20
allowed to be polluted or leaky pipes drain water away.'

The main problem with governmental operation of water resources is under122
Without
priced water. 121 Governments set the price of water at below cost.
enough money to cover existing services, there is little opportunity to generate
123
When water becomes
more revenue and expand services to meet rising demand.
12 4
sources.
unavailable, unreliable, or unsafe, the poor look for water from unsafe
The great advantage of governmental control is that governments are
accountable to the people. In democratic, or even pseudo-democratic states, the
people have some ability to express displeasure and hold decision-makers
Right-holders (the
accountable-again the Bolivian example is instructive.
people) can legitimately demand that duty-bearers (governments) respect their
right to water. 125 Governments or States Parties can also be held accountable in
26
Because water is a public good,
international institutions and organizations.
centralized democratic control by the government means greater adherence to
those Five Basic Principles underlying all human rights.
C. ParticipatoryDevelopment Projects
27
Elionor
When government policies fail, NGOs often step in to fill the gaps.'
Ostrom, author of Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action, observed that "neither the state nor the market is uniformly
successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural
resource systems."' 12 8 Where neither government nor markets are dominant,
communities manage common resources over long periods of time with some
success. 129 The Achilles heel of common control of a common resource is "the
tragedy of the commons."' 130 This is the name Garrett Hardin, author of the
influential essay titled The Tragedy of the Commons, gave to the problem of
13
individually rational strategies that lead to collectively irrational outcomes. ' The
basic problem is that each individual acts in his or her own interest, but

119. Wanja Njuguna-Githinji, Africa, at http://www.ittind.com/waterbook/afica.asp (last visited
Jan. 29, 2005).
120. Id.
121. Landry & Anderson, supranote 31.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Margaret Catley-Carlson, Worldngfor Water, in JEHL, supra note 2, at 65, 69

125. See Sengupta supranote 62.
126. See STEINER & ALSTON, supranote 46 at 305-316.
127. Jon Lane, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's): New Players in Water Policy, at
http://www.ittind.com/waterbookfNGOs.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
128. ELIONOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR

COLLECTIVE ACTION, 1 (1990).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2-4.
131. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243-1248 (1968); see also id. at
2-7 (explaining Hardin's article in the context of a prisoners dilemma game).
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collectively use a common resource (i.e. the commons). If each individual
maximizes their profit by using the commons to the fullest extent possible, the
32
commons are destroyed and everyone loses. A solution is collective agreement.'
At the center of the tragedy is the free-rider problem. 133 Ostrom described the
free-rider problem this way: "Whenever one person cannot be excluded from the
benefits that others provide, each person is motivated.., to free-ride on the efforts
of others."'' 34 Thus, even if collective action is established in the short-run, force
of the temptation to free-ride may eventually overwhelm any agreement over the
long term. 3 5 It is this problem that the participatory approach hopes to overcome
through education and community contributions to their projects. 136
A development project looks essentially like this: the NGO identifies a
community, conducts a needs assessment, identifies an appropriate project,
identifies local and other resources, acquires funding, implements the project, and
follows up with evaluation. 137 Participation at each step along the way is crucial to
achieve education of the community and to create a sense of local
empowerment. 3 8 Thus, participation is both a means and an end. 139 It expands
people's capabilities and improves performance by involving users in the decisionmaking process. 140
This has two important benefits: transparency and
independence.
Promoting transparency within the project increases the
participation of women and creates a greater consensus within the community.
Independence can be particularly important when working in countries with more
oppressive regimes because it allows communities to improve their situation
without needing to rely on slow, under-funded or corrupt bureaucratic government
agencies.
Criticisms of participatory development cover a wide spectrum.' 4 1 Here the
focus is on three important drawbacks of the participatory approach: (1) the short132. Id.
133. OSTROM, supranote 128, at 5.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. These two principles, education and community contribution, were at the heart every
development model this author studied as a Peace Corps volunteer. See generally WORLD BANK,
RURAL WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION TOOLKIT 33-39 (2004) (outlining the project cycle). See also

Brett, supra note 30, at I (exploring participatory theory in development).
137. Id. The exact process, and the way in which these steps are implemented, can vary greatly
depending on a huge number of factors. See also, Karen Fisher & Peter Urich, Information and
Communication in Stakeholder Participation:the Bohol-Cebu Water Supply Project, 40 ASIA PACIFIC

VIEWPOINT 251 (describing a step-by-step approach using an "instrumental participation" model).
138. E.A. Brett defines "participation" this way, "a process by which people, especially
disadvantaged people, influence decisions that affect them." Brett, supra note 30, at 5 (citing a World
Bank document). See also Trevor Parfitt, The Ambiguity of Participation:a Qualified Defense of
ParticipatoryDevelopment, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 537, 538 (2004) (listing four alternative definitions of
participation).
139. Brett, supra note 30, at 6; but see Parfitt, supra note 138, at 539 (describing participation as
either a means or and end, not necessarily both).
140. Brett, supranote 30, at 6.
141. See Mary Anderson, Aid: A Mixed Blessing, 10 DEV. IN PRACTICE 495 (2000); Sebastian
Mallaby, NGO's FightingPoverty, Hurting the Poor,FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept-Oct 2004, at 51.
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termist problem; (2) ignoring power differentials within communities; and (3)
dependence. 142 Short-termism describes a scenario wherein a local population is
mobilized for the project, but once the task is completed, participation
evaporates. 43 Ignoring power differentials can result in projects where the
intended beneficiary is the populace at large, but the more powerful members of
the community actually capture that benefit. 44 Finally, the inherent problems of
dependence on outside help or aid, despite the empowering effects of a
participatory approach, can be real.145 These are the problems
that ultimately
46
doomed well intentioned projects in Cameroon and elsewhere.
IV. How CAN WATER

BE DELIVERED?

In Ghana, in the 1990's, as few as forty percent of the 8,600 hand-pumps
constructed by the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) and NGOs
were working at any given time. 147 As a Peace Corps volunteer in Cameroon this
author saw first-hand the problem of broken pumps.
In Cameroon, hundreds of wells had been built by an international NGO with
the help of the villagers. They were lined with cement and covered with a hand
pump. Yet women and children were getting their water from streams running
under roads because the pumps were broken. In one village, a technician estimated
that it would cost about eighteen U.S. dollars to repair their pump. What about the
water committee that had been formed to manage the pump? They had collected a
fee from everyone who used the well on a monthly basis-where was that money?
The chief's brother had borrowed the money and was going to pay it back as soon
as he could. The loan was two years past due. Raising the money was equally
problematic because the chief's brother, head of the water committee, would be
organizing the effort. Although a donation of one dollar per month by each family
head for a period of three months would have raised enough money to fix the well,
when it came to making the requireddonation no one contributed.
A. Broken Pumps
On its face, the program that created these wells was a model of good
development practices. The villagers had to contribute by doing all the manual
labor and providing materials such as gravel and sand to mix with the cement.
Two villagers were trained on how to keep the pump working, to repair it, and to
keep the water clean. The whole village was given lessons on the importance of
clean water, proper hygiene, and sanitation. The water committee was comprised
142. Parfitt, supra note 138; NGO's, Gina Porter, Poverty Reduction in a Globalizing World:
Perspectivesfrom Ghana, 3 PROGRESS IN DEV. STUD. 131, 141 (2003).

143. Parfitt, supra note 138, at 539.
144. Id. at 539-540.
145. There is much debate as to whether aid creates dependency. Cf Mark Bradury, Normalizing
the Crisis in Africa, 22 DISASTERS 328, 332 (2000) (describing the "myth of dependency" and
"dependency syndrome" and then arguing against them).
146. The author spent two years as a Peace Corps volunteer in Cameroon as a Health and Water
Sanitation Volunteer. He draws on this experience throughout the remaining sections. Many
observations are the author's opinion, the verification of which is beyond the scope of this paper.
147. WATER AND SANITATION PROGRAM, supra note 33, at 2.
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of both women and men. This model is followed by almost every international
development agency in the world, including the Peace Corps. 48 Yet, it failed.
There were two fundamental problems: (1) there was no accountability for
those in charge of the wells; and (2) there was no incentive to maintain the wells.
Once a well broke, the villagers would go back to getting water from whatever
source they used before the well was built. Then the villagers would wait for the
government or a development agency to come and fix their well. The water
committee was designed to prevent these problems from occurring. As part of
ensuring a sustainable project, the village was organized to participate in the
building and maintenance of the well. This participation was designed to create a
sense of ownership and a lasting ability to keep the well working. Unfortunately,
the development model described above did not take into account the deep and
troubling effect that corruption has on rural communities. In many of these
communities, there is no accountability and no faith that laws will be enforced
fairly because the powerful are protected. Add to this a perception of time that
encourages short-term benefits over long-term plans and the chances of this model
succeeding decrease dramatically.
The lack of accountability stems from the very nature of village lifehierarchical structures that protect the men in charge from their misdeeds. Chiefis
not an elected position. Lack of accountability also stems from the pervasive
nature of corruption that plagues all levels of society. No consequences flow from
a broken pump to those responsible for repairs. There are consequences
however-disease and death from unclean water.
The severity of the
consequences should be incentive enough to fix the well, but sadly it is not. Life is
lived in the short-term. The realities of village life dictate that it does not make
sense to give up money you need now, particularly in light of the high risk that the
donation will achieve nothing-even though a baby may die from dehydration
brought on by diarrhea caused by polluted water. Malaria or AIDS is just as likely
to kill and there are crops to tend to and mouths to feed. The communal model,
designed on principles of empowerment and self-reliance, fail because the model
does not address the deeper cultural obstacles inherent in village life or the impact
that corruption has on the basic trust required to maintain a community resource.
B. Private Wells
Elinor Ostrom proposed what she termed a "fifth game" in the prisoner's
dilemma.1 49 In this scenario, the community makes a "binding contract" to commit
themselves to a cooperative strategy before they use the resource and share equally

148. See Parifit,supra note 138.
149. Ostrom, supra note 128, at 15. The Prisoners Dilemma a non-cooperative (no communication
between players) "game" in which players must choose one of two paths. The first is a "defect" path in
which players maximize their personal use of the commons; unless the other player picks the same
strategy. If that happens, both players get zero. The second path is a "cooperative" choice to reduce
their maximum by half risking either zero or half the maximum, depending on what the other person
does (the player's choices are unknown by others until after they have been made). The dilemma is that
the individually rational strategy (maximize) leads to a collectively irrational outcome (zero). Id. at 4-5.
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in the cost of enforcement.15° She then adds a private party to take on the role of
an external enforcer to arbitrate decisions, but not make or impose them. This
article advocates a similar proposal combining certain aspects of both the common
ownership and private ownership models and uses basic market incentives to
ensure both quality and access to water without sacrificing local control. The
scenario used to demonstrate how such a system would work is modeled on the
village described above, one with a well, broken pumps, and a corrupt water
committee.1 51
Under the model proposed here, the NGO would go into villages and offer to
fix their well in exchange for the exclusive right to manage the well. 52 The
process of explaining the implications of this transfer of control would conform to
well-established methods using participative discussions that include women and
occur over a period of time. This would enable villages to make an educated
decision. The process would have to be transparent to ensure consensus within the
village. Next, the NGO would find a villager (the "Manager") to lease the well to
after it had been refurbished. Both the village and the NGO must approve the
Manager. The Manager would receive extensive training on the technical aspects
of maintaining the well and would be personally responsible for completing all
repairs and ensuring water quality. The Manager would also receive extensive
training on running a small business, pricing models, and accounting. The
Manager would then sell the water to the village. Pricing schemes would include
monthly fees for unlimited access and charges on a per unit basis or other methods
offered as a menu. The Manager would be competing with the free (unsafe) water
source so prices would have to be reasonable and at the same time make him
enough money to pay the NGO each month for his lease. Any money the Manager
makes above his monthly rent would profit to him.' 53
To compete, the water must be cleaner, safer, and closer than the free water.
This provides the manager with the incentive to both keep the prices low but the
quality of the water high. The NGO will oversee all of this, providing guidance
and accountability by periodic testing of the water. Creative managers may offer
services as well, such as having water delivered (employing locals to haul the
water) or by selling bottled water. Finally, managers that abuse their position,
charge high prices, or otherwise extort the community would be removed by the
NGO at the request of the community. Evaluations and surveys of the manager's
performance would be conducted to provide both an ongoing source of information
for improving the program and to ensure accountability. Because the manager has
to pay a monthly fee as well as all maintenance and repair costs, they would have

150. Id. at 15, 16.
151. In Cameroon the government has proposed the provision of a well or borehole (deep well)
equipped with a hand-powered pump for every 300 to 500 people. Tetchaida, supranote 10.
152. The legal implications of enforcing such a deal would require conformity with local laws and
usually the agreement of a government official to actually enforce the agreement should a dispute arise.
Similar agreements were used in the Ghana. See WATER AND SANITATION PROGRAM, supra note 33, at
3.
153. The masculine pronoun is used here to represent both potential male and female managers.
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an incentive to use the water efficiently and avoid waste. 154 The NGO would use
the money from the monthly lease payments 155
to cover its own costs and as capital
to repair more wells and expand the program.
V. A RECOMMENDATION:

DO PRIVATIZED WELLS PROTECT THE RIGHT TO WATER?

According to Ostrom: "What is missing from... well developed theories of
human organization... is an adequately specified theory of collective action
whereby a group of principals can organize themselves voluntarily to retain the
residuals of their own efforts."' 5 6 The concerns that have been raised about the
privatization of water are very real. Putting such a valuable resource in the hands
of unaccountable corporations driven by profit motives rather than humanitarian
concerns is troublesome. With global water shortages looming in the future, world
peace will depend on an equitable and secure system of meeting the demand for
water. 157 The possibility of actual war over water is serious enough that U.S.
intelligence services have identified a number of potential areas where water wars
could erupt. 158 Thus, control over water resources will be critical to meeting
human needs and maintaining peace in the future.
In a privatized system, those who have water provide it to those who do notbut only to those who can pay. In a purely market driven system the poor will
always be excluded based on an inability to pay, which violates their human right
to water. However, turning water over to governments or communities that are
unable to manage it effectively produces the same effect. Though it is selfinflicted, the obligation to provide water does not end just because a community
itself is responsible for any failure to provide for its own needs. 159 The plan set
forth here meets the obligations outlined by the Committee and the practical
concerns of the villagers on the ground who deserve clean water.
A. EvaluatingCompliance with Human Rights Standards
Evaluating compliance with the human right to water begins with the three
basic obligations under human rights standards: to respect, to protect, and to fulfill.
The duty to respect requires a government to ensure the activities of its institutions
154. See generally Ostrom, supra note 128, at 41 (using the theory of the firm and the theory of the
state to explain collective action can be maintained when the burden of that action falls on an individual
whose returns are directly related to the surplus generated).
155. The most fundamental question is: will villagers ever pay for water if they are used to it being
free? The answer is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say, given the evidence of how
many villagers have been willing to pay for water at some point, it follows that they would pay for safe,
high quality water. See e.g., GLEICK ET. AL., supra note 23, at vi (stating: "Experience has shown that
water users are often willing to pay for improvements in service when such improvements are designed
with their participation and when improvements are actually delivered.").
156. Ostrom, supra note 128, at 25.
157. PETER
ALLISON,
WATER
WARS-THE
GLOBAL
VIEWPOINT,
at
http://www.ittind.com/waterbook/world.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) (outlining the real possibility of
water shortages and advocating for privatization).
158. Id.
159. See Comment 15, supra note 9, at 38 "[T]he Committee wishes to emphasize that it is
particularly incumbent on States parties, and other actors in a position to assist, to provide international
assistance and cooperation..." (emphasis added).
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and agencies do not interfere with a person's access to water. 160 The proposed plan
requires that governments have laws in place that would permit the NGO to own
and lease wells. It would require the NGO to work with the government to share
information and to ensure that the government's interests are being protected. The
proposed plan would also require that the NGO be free from interference by those
who would use it for political patronage. These requirements would have to be
conditions precedent to implementation of this plan. By supporting this plan, the
government would also fulfill the obligation to not go back-the duty of nonretrogression.161
The obligation to respect the right to water means that people cannot be
unfairly or arbitrarily disconnected or refused water by laws, government
regulations, or pricing policies. This plan is designed to have the flexibility to
respond to each individual situation and to price water in such a way that, when
disaster strikes, no one is left without water. Rather than dealing with a faceless
bureaucrat, the villagers would be working with a Manager they participated in
choosing, and if that Manager abuses his position he can be removed.
The obligation to protect requires that governments do not allow others to
endanger the right to water.' 62 It also means that the quality of water provided is
protected.163 This plan empowers the NGO to remove the water concession from
an abusive or ineffective Manager. By monitoring water quality, the NGO holds
the Manager accountable while also supporting his enterprise by showing villagers
that his water is higher quality. Other conditions such as the distance between the
well and latrines or graves can also be monitored so that pollution can be avoided.
Finally, because the Manager is personally responsible for ensuring water quality,
there is an incentive to protect the well as a source of revenue. The work required
to keep the well covered, chlorinated, and clear of animals is compensated by the
profit the Manager makes.
The obligation to fulfill is a forward-looking obligation to facilitate, promote,
and provide for the full realization of the right to water. 64 This means that
programs such as this should be encouraged and promoted, but not imposed.
Solutions must be tailor-made to the individual situation of each population. One
of the most enduring efforts is to educate communities about the hygienic use of
water and its protection. 165 Beyond this, a rights based approach to development
includes educating people about their rights and empowering them to take control
of their lives.' 66 The education process that precedes the purchase of the well and
the lease to the Manager meets these obligations. Even if a village decides not to

160. Id.121.
161. Id. 19.
162. Id. 23.
163. Id.
164. Id. 25, 26.
165. Paragraph 25 reads: "The obligation to promote obliges the State party to take steps to ensure
that there is appropriate education concerning the hygienic use of water, protection of water sources and
methods to minimize water wastage." Id. 25.
166. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supranote 72, at 9.
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go through with the program, they will have learned a great deal, enough to
provide hope that they will protect and manage their water source better than
before.
Finally, this plan should be evaluated against the Five Legal Principles
discussed as part of the right to development: equity, non-discrimination,
participation, accountability, and transparency. The process of educating the
village, including women and children, is essential to meeting the first three
principles. The on-going oversight of the NGO provides the accountability and
transparency needed not only to comply with human rights principles, but also to
overcome the problems typically faced by programs created through participatory
development projects. Finally, providing a conflict-resolution mechanism helps
reinforce all these principles as well as discourage the free-rider problem. 167
B. Evaluating Compliance with the Nine Core Obligations
The nine core obligations are to: (1) ensure access to sufficient and safe
water; (2) ensure non-discriminatory access; (3) ensure physical access; (4) ensure
secure access; (5) ensure equitable distribution; (6) ensure adoption of a national
water strategy and plan of action; (7) monitor the realization of the right to water;
(8) implement low-cost programs targeted at marginalized groups: and (9) prevent,
treat, and control diseases linked to water. 68 The proposed plan, if implemented
with governmental support, directly meets the first five and the last two core
obligations. A well located in the village that is available to everyone within a
system that differentiates between differing ability to pay through creative pricing
meets those seven obligations.
This program also indirectly addresses obligation six and seven by
implicating the government in its creation and implementation. 69 Monitoring is
part of every NGO's grant funding requirements, and by drawing on development
models, NGOs can effectively report their progress to governmental and
international organizations. Further, the incentive to have accurate information is
strengthened as regular feedback from the evaluations and surveys are built into
the program's success. Because future funding comes from the manager's lease
payments, success is tied directly to funding in much the same way a profit
incentive motivates private companies.
The fear that people will not pay and therefore be denied access to high
quality water is the principle objection to this plan. Aside from creative pricing
schemes that can be adopted to avoid denial of access, an additional reality of
village life should be taken into account--communal existence. Nothing prevents
a manager from extending credit, or giving away water in times of need.
Additionally, a family that pays a fee for unlimited access can provide water to
those who may not have the same level of resources. The potential for abuse is
undeniably high but the problem can be confronted directly during the educational

167. See Ostrom, supra note 128, at 101.
168. Comment 15, supra note 9.
169. Id.
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discussions with the village at the programs inception. 170 Villages are never as
poor as outsiders perceive them to be. Alternative forms of payment or barter
schemes are possible as well. The Committee directly addressed the question of
failure to pay in paragraph 56 of General Comment 15: "Where such action is
based on a person's failure to pay for water their capacity to pay must be taken into
account. Under no circumstancesshall an individual be deprived of the minimum
essential level of water."''
C. Final Considerations
Two final qualifications regarding implementation of the proposed plan must
be considered. First, this program is designed for relatively small rural villages not
likely to be connected to municipal systems--exactly the people contemplated in
obligation eight. A program such as this implemented on a larger scale in urban
areas begins to resemble government-private sector partnership schemes that
already exist in many places.1 72 Second, the proposed plan would have to be
implemented in several phases. This paper is not intended as a description of how
to actually implement such a program and real questions remain about its
feasibility.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to offer a solution to the failures of programs
advanced by both the proponents of privatization, who view water as a need and
commodity on the one hand, and the proponents of water as a human right and
communal resource on the other. Water is a human right, and governments have
real obligations in realizing those rights. The challenges faced by governments
and the global community to meet those obligations will only grow in the coming
decades. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to these problems, but the program
offered here addresses both the challenges and realities on the ground. Market
incentives are powerful and by harnessing those forces, safe, clean water can be
available to everyone. The key to any program will be accountability. Larger
forces such as the spread of democracy and the rule of law will have to be part of
long-term solutions to resource scarcity. By working with existing development
models and learning from past failures, problems can be addressed in small ways,
village-by-village, and well-by-well. Experimentation by rectifying the failures of
existing development models on an ad hoc basis may be the only way to ensure the
right to water in marginalized and poor rural communities.

170. As Elinor Ostrom points out, "when appropriators design at least some of their own rules...
they can learn from experience to craft enforceable rather than unenforceable rules." Ostrom, supra
note 128, at 96.
171. Comment 15, supra note 9, at 56 (emphasis added).
172. See generally GLEICK ET AL., supranote 23 (discussing different public/private partnerships).

